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Abstract
Background: Public health departments in the United States are beginning to gain timely access to health
data, often as soon as one day after a visit to a health care facility. Consequently, new approaches to
outbreak surveillance are being developed. When cases cluster geographically, an analysis of their spatial
distribution can facilitate outbreak detection. Our method focuses on detecting perturbations in the
distribution of pair-wise distances among all patients in a geographical region. Barring outbreaks, this
distribution can be quite stable over time. We sought to exemplify the method by measuring its cluster
detection performance, and to determine factors affecting sensitivity to spatial clustering among patients
presenting to hospital emergency departments with respiratory syndromes.
Methods:  The approach was to (1) define a baseline spatial distribution of home addresses for a
population of patients visiting an emergency department with respiratory syndromes using historical data;
(2) develop a controlled feature set simulation by inserting simulated outbreak data with varied parameters
into authentic background noise, thereby creating semisynthetic data; (3) compare the observed with the
expected spatial distribution; (4) establish the relative value of different alarm strategies so as to maximize
sensitivity for the detection of clustering; and (5) measure factors which have an impact on sensitivity.
Results: Overall sensitivity to detect spatial clustering was 62%. This contrasts with an overall alarm rate
of less than 5% for the same number of extra visits when the extra visits were not characterized by
geographic clustering. Clusters that produced the least number of alarms were those that were small in
size (10 extra visits in a week, where visits per week ranged from 120 to 472), diffusely distributed over
an area with a 3 km radius, and located close to the hospital (5 km) in a region most densely populated
with patients to this hospital. Near perfect alarm rates were found for clusters that varied on the opposite
extremes of these parameters (40 extra visits, within a 250 meter radius, 50 km from the hospital).
Conclusion: Measuring perturbations in the interpoint distance distribution is a sensitive method for
detecting spatial clustering. When cases are clustered geographically, there is clearly power to detect
clustering when the spatial distribution is represented by the M statistic, even when clusters are small in
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size. By varying independent parameters of simulated outbreaks, we have demonstrated empirically the
limits of detection of different types of outbreaks.
Background
Public health departments in the United States are begin-
ning to gain timely access to health data, often as soon as
one day after a visit to a health care facility [1-3]. Conse-
quently, new approaches to surveillance for disease out-
breaks are being developed. These methods require
models for baseline patterns and thresholds to detect unu-
sual events [1]. Baseline patterns can be modeled in terms
of temporal characteristics, spatial characteristics, or both.
When cases are clustered geographically, such as those in
the Amoy Gardens apartment complex during the 2003
SARS epidemic [4], an analysis of their spatial distribution
may greatly facilitate the detection of a disease outbreak.
Methods for both temporal and spatial surveillance have
been recently reviewed [5,6].
One consideration regarding appropriate baseline data for
spatial surveillance is whether to use individual point
locations or aggregate counts by regions such as census
tracts. Because aggregating points may result in a loss of
precision [7], our work uses precise locations, i.e. geoco-
ded patient addresses expressed as longitude and latitude.
The novel approach of our method focuses on the detec-
tion of perturbations in the distribution of mutual dis-
tances among all the individual points in a geographical
region to identify clusters [8-10]. Barring outbreaks, this
distribution of interpoint distances can be quite stable
over time (see Figure 1) [9]. We sought to measure the
cluster detection performance of our method, and to
determine factors affecting sensitivity to spatial clustering
among patients presenting to hospital emergency depart-
ments (ED) with respiratory syndromes.
Methods
This study identifies factors affecting the performance of
an algorithm for measuring the degree of deviation from
an expected geographic distribution of patient home
addresses for a population visiting a localized site of care.
The home address is only one of many possible places
where a person might be exposed during an actual out-
break. However, other locations are not routinely
recorded in the administrative databases typically used for
syndromic surveillance. The approach was to (1) define a
baseline spatial distribution of home addresses for
patients visiting an emergency department with respira-
tory syndromes using historical data; (2) develop a con-
trolled feature set simulation by inserting simulated
outbreak data with varied parameters into authentic back-
ground noise, thereby creating semisynthetic data [11];
(3) compare the observed with the expected spatial distri-
bution; (4) establish the relative value of different alarm
strategies so as to maximize sensitivity for the detection of
clustering; and (5) measure factors which have an impact
on sensitivity.
Study population
Data were obtained retrospectively from hospital data-
bases. The study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board. Subjects were ED patients with respiratory syn-
dromes treated at an urban, academic, pediatric, tertiary
care hospital from December 24, 2000 to December 20,
2003. These dates were chosen to span the four seasons
over three years while maintaining complete seven-day
weeks. Patients with respiratory syndromes were identi-
fied by chief complaints and diagnostic codes as described
in previous reports [1,12]. Of the total of 155,705 ED vis-
its, 28% (43,156) were classified as having respiratory
syndromes.
Home addresses of patients were translated to geographic
coordinates using ArcGIS 8.1 (Environmental Systems
Research Institute, Inc., Redlands, CA). Addresses were
cleaned prior to geocoding using software (ZP4, Sema-
phore Corp., Aptos, CA) that matched addresses to the
August 2003 United States Postal Service ZIP+4 database
and made corrections. 93% (40,221) of the home
addresses were successfully geocoded and patients who
lived within 80 kilometers of the hospital (98%) were
included in the study, for a total of 39,229 respiratory
visits.
The number of visits for respiratory syndrome varied by
season: 13,156 (34%) in the winter, 9,140 (23%) in the
spring, 6,382 (16%) in the summer, and 10,551 (27%) in
the fall. The home addresses of study patients were not
evenly distributed within the study area. 14,231 (36%)
lived from 0–5 km of the hospital, 16,351 (42%) from 5–
15 km, 7,545 (19%) from 15–50 km, and 1,102 (3%)
from 50–80 km (see Figure 2).
Baseline spatial distribution of home addresses
The baseline spatial distribution was represented by a set
of bins, each containing an equal proportion of pair-wise
distance values. To establish this baseline, the three years
of data were divided into 156 individual, one-week-long
data sets. The number of respiratory visits each week
ranged from 120 to 472. The average number varied by
season: winter 346 (s.d. 68), spring 229 (s.d. 43), summer
164 (s.d. 28), and fall 271 (s.d. 49). For each week of data,BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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all n(n-1)/2 pair-wise distances among patient addresses
were calculated as follows:
d = 6378 × 2 × arcsin ( ), a = sin2 ((Y1 - Y2 )/2) + cos (Y2
) × cos (Y1 ) × sin2 ((X1 - X2 )/2),
where Y1 and Y2 are latitude in radians for point 1 and
point 2 of the pair, X1 and X2 are longitude in radians, and
d is the interpoint distance in kilometers.
The sets of weekly pair-wise distances were combined into
separate data sets by season, and then into a single data set
with all seasons combined. Distance values in each data
set were ranked in order of magnitude, and divided into
ten bins, each with the same number of distance values.
To maintain equal proportions, the widths varied (neces-
sarily) across bins. Bin ranges were relatively small for the
initial bins (2.6 km on average for bins 1–6), then
increased somewhat (9.3 km on average for bins 7–9),
with one large final bin (117 km). Next, each distance
value in the individual week-long data sets was assigned
the bin number into which it fell. For example, if one of
the distance values between two patients during a particu-
lar winter week was 5 km, then that value fell into bin 3
because its endpoints were from 4.8 to 6.9 km. The
number of records in each bin each week was then
counted. This resulted in some variability in terms of how
many pairs fell into each bin each week, although aver-
aged over all of the weeks, each bin contained 10% of all
distance values.
Pair-wise distances between home addresses of respiratory patients to one hospital over three years by season Figure 1
Pair-wise distances between home addresses of respiratory patients to one hospital over three years by sea-
son. The twelve curves (4 seasons × 3 years) overlap considerably, suggesting stability for the distance distribution over time. 
The maximum interpoint distance was 100 miles; the distribution up to 50 is shown.
aBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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Controlled feature set simulation
Outbreaks were simulated by adding additional visits to
the baseline data. 288 simulated spatial clusters were
created using a cluster creation software tool [13]. Each
cluster was added to each of the 156 week-long data sets,
resulting in 44,928 weekly data sets containing simulated
clusters. The clusters varied in size (10, 25, 40 additional
visits), distance from the hospital (5, 15, 50 km), and
radius of the circle within which points were randomly
scattered (0.25, 0.5, 1, 3 km).
In addition, the special situation of an outbreak character-
ized by an increased number of visits originating over the
whole geographic area of interest and, in effect, having no
geographic clustering, was studied. Three data sets that
varied on size (10, 25, 40 additional visits) were created to
simulate this situation. Coordinates were randomly
selected from the entire three years of data so that the extra
visits would reflect the underlying geographic distribution
of the study population. Each data set was inserted into
each of the 156 week-long data sets, resulting in 468
weekly data sets containing extra visits dispersed ran-
domly over the entire geographic area.
Comparison of observed versus expected spatial patterns
A metric, the M statistic, was used to characterize a dis-
crepancy between an expected proportion of distance
values in each bin and the actual proportions [9,10] using
a nonparametric comparison based on the covariance
matrix. Bins endpoints had been defined so that the
Baseline distribution of respiratory patients to the emergency department of one hospital Figure 2
Baseline distribution of respiratory patients to the emergency department of one hospital. The study population 
(blue dots) lived within 80 km of the hospital (black ring). Simulated clusters were placed at 5, 15, and 50 km, along the red 
rings. Total population density of study patients within the four areas pictured was: 182.6 per square km within 0–5 km of the 
hospital, 32.6 per sq km within 5–15 km, 1.3 per sq km within 15–50 km, and 0.1 per sq km within 50–80 km.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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expected proportions were equal for all bins. The statistic
is intended to be sensitive to deviations in the geographic
distribution. The M statistic was calculated as follows:
M = (obs - exp)T S- (obs - exp)
where obs is a vector of normalized observed proportions,
exp is a vector of normalized expected proportions, S is a
10 × 10 variance-covariance matrix of the baseline propor-
tions (calculated with data for 156 weeks). T refers to the
transpose of the matrix, and S- refers to the Moore-Penrose
generalized inverse of the S matrix. Proportions were nor-
malized by dividing the bin frequency by the total for all
bins and multiplying by 100.
Cutoff values
To evaluate the M statistic, cutoff values to indicate clus-
tering were established for each season and for all seasons
combined. A simulated baseline data set without extra vis-
its or clusters was used to determine cutoff values at which
a false positive alarm rate of .05 could be maintained. This
baseline was generated from repeated random samples of
patient locations from the week-long data sets described
above.
Because the number of ED visits each week varied, sample
sizes were generated from a list of weekly visit frequencies.
For each season, 1000 frequency values were randomly
selected from the weeks that comprised the season. For
each of these values, that many addresses were randomly
selected from the entire set of actual patient addresses for
the season. The M statistic for each data set was calculated,
and the 1000 values of the statistic were ranked by magni-
tude. In separate steps, the 1000 sample sizes were ranked,
and the values of M times the sample size were also
ranked. This process was repeated for each season. Finally,
all seasons were combined and the entire process was
repeated, using 5000 instead of 1000 samples for the all-
season data. All cutoff values were based on percentile
ranks.
Alarm strategies for the detection of clustering
Six alarm strategies utilizing the M statistic and the
number (N) of ED respiratory visits were evaluated. These
strategies are listed in Table 1. Each was designed to main-
tain a false positive rate of 0.05. Two strategies focused
only on the number of visits and were included as a com-
parison to strategies that incorporated spatial informa-
tion. Because N was not the focus of this study, more
complex models for the time series data [14,15] were not
investigated. Two strategies evaluated the geographic dis-
tribution of patient addresses, and two combined infor-
mation regarding both the number of visits and the
geographic distribution. Four of the six strategies ignored
season, and cutoff values were established using the 5000
all-seasons samples. Two strategies required separate val-
ues for each season, and the 1000 samples for each season
were used to establish these cutoffs. Each alarm strategy
was applied to each semisynthetic data set. Sensitivity to
the true positive alarms in the data sets with simulated
clusters was expected to be high. On the other hand, false
alarm rates for data with random additional visits were
expected to be near 5% for strategies that evaluated the
geographic distribution of visits.
Results
Overall performance of the alarm strategies
Overall sensitivity to detect clustering with the addition of
simulated geographic clusters is listed in Table 2 by alarm
strategy and time of year. Note that use of a single MN cut-
off value at the 95th percentile yielded the highest overall
sensitivity (62%), and the highest values by season, except
for winter, where it was the second best strategy. There-
fore, the presentation of results will highlight this strategy,
although sensitivity for the other strategies is included in
subsequent tables.
Evident in Table 2 is the observation that reliance only on
the detection of an increased number of visits was a poor
strategy when clusters were relatively small in size. Sensi-
tivity was generally improved by instead relying on the
Table 1: Description of alarm strategies for the detection of spatial clustering.
Alarm strategy Description
N > 95th percentile Number of ED respiratory visits is too high
N > 95th percentile, by season Number of visits is too high, separate values by season
M > 95th percentile M statistic is too high
M > 95th percentile, by season M statistic is too high, separate values for each season
MN > 95th percentile Calculate M × N, value is too high
N and MN rules N is too high (top 0.5% distribution)
Or M × N is too high (top 0.5% distribution)
Or both N is high (>80%) and M × N is high (>80%)
N = number of hospital emergency department respiratory visits, M = M statistic, used to characterize the geographic distribution.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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geographic distribution of the clustered points. Sensitivity
was most improved when both the increased number and
the spatial distribution was incorporated into the alarm
strategy.
Alarm rates when extra visits are not characterized by 
spatial clustering
A special situation examined in this study was an increase
in the number of visits at the same three sizes as the cluster
sizes. However, these additional visits were not deliber-
ately characterized by spatial clustering. This scenario
could represent either a random increase in visits or an
outbreak spread over the entire region. The methods used
Table 2: Overall sensitivity to detect spatial clustering.
Percent of simulated outbreaks that exceeded a threshold
Alarm strategy All seasons a Winter b Spring b Summer b Fall b
N > 95th percentile 8.76 33.33 0.00 0.00 2.56
N > 95th percentile, by season 16.24 11.40 21.67 19.66 11.97
M > 95th percentile 49.17 26.68 53.34 73.71 42.26
M > 95th percentile, by season 49.13 43.61 49.42 55.35 48.01
MN > 95th percentile 62.32 55.43 63.49 70.90 59.27
N and MN rules 55.83 66.60 49.61 55.01 52.52
a The standard errors for All seasons were all less than or equal to 0.2%.
b The standard errors for Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall were all less than or equal to 0.5%.
Table 3: Alarm rates for extra visits that are not characterized by geographic clustering.
Percent of simulated outbreaks that exceeded a threshold
Alarm strategy # extra visits per week All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
N > 95th percentile 10 6.41 23.68 0.00 0.00 2.56
Overall rate = 8.76 25 8.97 34.21 0.00 0.00 2.56
40 10.90 42.11 0.00 0.00 2.56
N > 95th percentile, by season 10 9.62 7.89 12.50 10.26 7.69
Overall rate = 16.24 25 14.74 10.53 20.00 15.38 12.82
40 24.36 15.79 32.50 33.33 15.38
M > 95th percentile 10 3.21 0.00 0.00 12.82 0.00
Overall rate = 2.14 25 3.21 0.00 2.50 10.26 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M > 95th percentile, by season 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall rate = 0 25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MN > 95th percentile 10 4.49 2.63 2.50 12.82 0.00
Overall rate = 3.42 25 5.13 5.26 5.00 5.13 5.13
40 0.64 2.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
N and MN rules 10 7.69 26.32 2.50 0.00 2.56
Overall rate = 7.48 25 7.05 21.05 2.50 0.00 5.13
40 7.69 23.68 5.00 0.00 2.56
Overall rate is percent positive alarms, regardless of number of extra visits and season. Strategies that only considered N were expected to yield 
alarm rates greater than the false positive rate of 5% because extra visits were added. Strategies that considered the spatial distribution were 
expected to yield alarm rates near 5% because the extra visits were not spatially clustered.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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in this study were not designed to be sensitive to situa-
tions where outbreaks do not cluster spatially. Therefore,
alarm rates under these conditions could represent either
a false alarm rate or a low sensitivity to widely dispersed
outbreaks. Rates for each strategy by season are presented
in Table 3. The strategies that consider the spatial distribu-
tion generally maintained false alarm rates near the
desired rate of 5%, with a notable exception of one strat-
egy in the winter.
Factors affecting sensitivity to detect clustering
The simulated clusters varied on several parameters. Sen-
sitivity for the four alarm strategies that use the M statistic
by cluster size, by distance from the hospital, and by den-
sity of the cluster are reported in Tables 4, 5, 6. The two
strategies that use only N are not included in these tables
because the geographic parameters are ignored by those
strategies and results would be identical to those pre-
sented in Table 3.
Table 4: Sensitivity to detect clustering with simulated clusters of three sizes.
Percent of simulated outbreaks that exceeded a threshold
Alarm strategy # extra visits All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
M > 95th percentile 10 15.40 1.29 13.28 41.56 5.18
25 53.75 21.33 62.29 84.94 45.41
40 78.35 57.43 84.45 94.63 76.20
M > 95th percentile, by season 10 8.30 6.30 7.81 11.73 7.32
25 57.41 47.09 60.34 65.52 56.36
40 81.69 77.44 80.10 88.81 80.34
MN > 95th percentile 10 20.93 13.87 21.43 32.69 15.52
25 74.69 65.35 76.61 84.70 71.82
40 91.35 87.06 92.42 95.33 90.46
N and MN rules 10 14.86 35.22 6.43 9.56 8.97
25 65.12 74.67 57.68 67.17 61.38
40 87.50 89.91 84.71 88.30 87.21
Table 5: Sensitivity to detect clustering with simulated clusters at three distances from the hospital.
Percent of simulated outbreaks that exceeded a threshold
Alarm strategy km from hospital All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
M > 95th percentile 5 34.74 12.76 37.29 63.40 24.89
15 56.78 33.43 61.73 79.24 51.98
50 62.17 39.82 67.89 82.91 57.36
M > 95th percentile, by season 5 33.20 27.68 30.19 43.76 31.11
15 57.65 55.64 56.76 65.35 52.84
50 63.38 54.35 69.55 61.90 67.31
MN > 95th percentile 5 49.33 41.82 50.58 60.26 44.42
15 69.81 62.78 71.01 76.89 68.35
50 73.41 67.51 74.40 80.13 71.40
N and MN rules 5 42.44 56.21 34.10 40.92 39.08
15 62.87 72.02 57.47 62.91 59.43
50 67.92 76.03 63.90 67.25 64.80
Patient population density was greatest at 5 km from the hospital and declined as distance away from the hospital increased.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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As shown in Table 4, clusters that are small in size pro-
duced the fewest alarms, with an overall sensitivity at size
10 of 21%. However, there was seasonal variability, from
a low of 14% in the winter to a high of 33% in the
summer. During the winter, when there were the most
baseline visits, a cluster of size 10 was about one-seventh
the size of the standard deviation for number of weekly
visits. In contrast, during the summer, this cluster size was
about one-third the standard deviation. With 25 points in
the cluster, sensitivity improved markedly to an overall
rate of 75%, and 40 clustered points yielded an overall
sensitivity of 91%. Again, seasonal variability was evident
Table 6: Sensitivity to detect clustering with simulated clusters of four radius sizes.
Percent of simulated outbreaks that exceeded a threshold
Alarm strategy Radius All seasons Winter Spring Summer Fall
M > 95th percentile 250 m 53.94 30.15 59.06 78.45 47.33
500 m 53.22 29.86 58.23 77.53 46.55
1 km 51.30 28.07 56.04 75.57 44.80
3 km 38.22 18.64 40.03 63.28 30.38
M > 95th percentile, by season 250 m 54.75 48.10 55.56 61.47 53.67
500 m 53.82 47.48 54.24 60.58 52.81
1 km 51.73 45.72 51.81 59.05 50.18
3 km 36.24 33.15 36.08 40.31 35.36
MN > 95th percentile 250 m 66.97 59.54 68.82 75.04 64.25
500 m 66.41 59.10 67.67 74.96 63.68
1 km 64.71 57.75 65.94 73.11 61.82
3 km 51.21 45.32 51.53 60.51 47.33
N and MN rules 250 m 60.67 69.52 55.00 61.18 57.34
500 m 59.93 69.12 54.10 60.33 56.55
1 km 58.28 67.91 52.47 58.33 54.81
3 km 44.44 59.87 36.88 40.21 41.38
Table 7: Sensitivity to detect clustering by number of extra visits, distance from the hospital, and radius of the simulated cluster.
Distance from the hospital
# extra visits Cluster radius 5 km 15 km 50 km
10 250 m 15.58 31.04 25.27
500 m 14.55 30.59 25.37
1 km 12.76 30.31 26.28
3 km 5.90 23.90 24.54
25 250 m 68.40 87.27 95.24
500 m 66.09 87.91 95.33
1 km 58.27 86.81 95.51
3 km 26.60 68.86 94.05
40 250 m 91.54 99.45 99.82
500 m 90.45 99.63 99.82
1 km 88.01 99.63 99.82
3 km 53.78 92.31 99.82
The numbers in the cells are the percentage of simulated outbreaks that exceeded the 95th percentile value of M × N (M statistic × number of 
visits).BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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Table 8: Sensitivity to detect clustering by season, number of extra visits, distance from the hospital, and radius of the simulated 
cluster.
Distance from the hospital
Cluster radius 5 km 15 km 50 km
WINTER
10 extra visits 250 m 11.58 18.05 16.92
500 m 11.05 18.05 16.92
1 km 10.00 18.80 18.05
3 km 5.00 12.78 16.92
25 extra visits 250 m 55.26 77.44 86.84
500 m 52.89 78.57 86.84
1 km 47.37 78.95 86.47
3 km 22.37 62.78 84.21
40 extra visits 250 m 83.95 98.50 99.25
500 m 82.63 98.87 99.25
1 km 78.16 98.87 99.25
3 km 41.58 91.73 99.25
SPRING
10 extra visits 250 m 16.50 33.93 23.93
500 m 14.00 32.86 23.93
1 km 12.50 32.50 25.00
3 km 7.25 27.14 22.86
25 extra visits 250 m 71.25 89.29 99.29
500 m 67.25 90.00 99.29
1 km 58.50 88.57 99.29
3 km 25.50 67.86 99.29
40 extra visits 250 m 95.50 99.64 100.00
500 m 94.00 99.64 100.00
1 km 92.25 99.64 100.00
3 km 52.50 91.07 100.00
SUMMER
10 extra visits 250 m 26.15 42.49 41.03
500 m 25.64 43.22 41.03
1 km 22.31 41.39 42.86
3 km 9.74 35.90 40.66
25 extra visits 250 m 84.10 95.24 98.53
500 m 83.33 95.60 98.90
1 km 75.13 94.87 99.27
3 km 38.97 77.66 99.27
40 extra visits 250 m 95.90 100.00 100.00
500 m 95.64 100.00 100.00
1 km 94.10 100.00 100.00
3 km 72.05 96.34 100.00
FALL
10 extra visits 250 m 7.95 29.30 19.05
500 m 7.44 27.84 19.41BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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with the lowest values in the winter and highest in the
summer.
In Table 5, the effect of cluster location is demonstrated
with clusters placed at three distances from the hospital.
Those closest were in regions most densely populated by
hospital patients, and were characterized by an overall
sensitivity of 49% at 5 km. At greater distances, where the
patient population density declined, sensitivity increased
to 70% and 73% at 15 and 50 km. Seasonal variability was
evident, with winter rates lowest and summer highest.
In Table 6, the effect of cluster dispersion is demonstrated
with four radius sizes within which extra visits were ran-
domly scattered. Although sensitivity declined with
increasing radius size, the effect was not dramatic at 250
m, 500 m, and 1 km where overall alarm rates decreased
from 67% to 65%. However, when the radius increased to
3 km, the decline in sensitivity was greater (51%). Once
again, winter rates were lower than summer, and the 3
smallest radii had very similar rates by season.
Interactions among cluster parameters
To investigate the effects of interactions among the cluster
parameters, a logistic regression analysis was performed.
Cluster size, distance to hospital, radius size, and all
higher order interactions were included in a model to pre-
dict whether or not the value of MN exceeded a threshold.
All terms were significant, and the maximum-rescaled R-
squared was .59. When season and all its interactions with
the other variables were added to the model described
above, an additional 3-way interaction was significant
(cluster size × distance to hospital × season). When this
interaction, season, and all two-way interactions with sea-
son were added to the first model, the maximum-rescaled
R-squared was .61.
To further investigate these interactions, analyses that
cross tabulated cluster size, distance from the hospital,
and cluster density, and those that cross tabulated these
variables with season were performed. Sensitivity values
were ranked from highest to lowest to determine which
type of cluster produced the least and the most alarms.
Overall results are presented in Table 7, and results by sea-
son in Table 8.
The simulated clusters that produced the fewest alarms
were those with 10 extra visits, placed 5 km from the hos-
pital within a circle having a radius of 3 km (sensitivity=
6%). Clusters of the same size, at the same distance, and
within increasingly smaller radii also yielded few alarms.
At this distance, underlying patient population density is
greatest. Clusters that produced the most alarms were
those with 40 extra visits, placed 50 km from the hospital,
and radius size did not matter. Furthermore, sensitivity
remained nearly as high (99%) when the same size clus-
ters were placed 15 km away as long as the radius was less
than 3 km. At these high rates, season had no effect on
sensitivity. With a midrange cluster size (25), there was
also high sensitivity (94–96%) at 50 km from the hospital
with any radius size, but the effect of time of year became
apparent. Winter rates (84–87%) at this distance for the
four radius sizes were lower than rates for the other sea-
sons (93–99%). Seasonal effects remained apparent as the
presence of clustering became more difficult to detect. For
clusters with the lowest alarm rates, those with 10 extra
visits, winter sensitivity values (5–19%) were roughly half
the size of summer values (10–43%). For clusters with 25
extra visits placed close to the hospital (5 km), winter rates
1 km 6.15 28.21 19.05
3 km 1.54 19.41 17.58
25 extra visits 250 m 62.56 86.81 95.97
500 m 60.51 87.18 95.97
1 km 51.79 84.62 96.70
3 km 19.49 67.03 93.04
40 extra visits 250 m 90.51 98.63 100.00
500 m 89.23 100.00 100.00
1 km 87.18 100.00 100.00
3 km 48.72 90.11 100.00
The numbers in the cells are the percentage of simulated outbreaks that exceeded the 95th percentile value of M × N (M statistic × number of 
visits).
Table 8: Sensitivity to detect clustering by season, number of extra visits, distance from the hospital, and radius of the simulated 
cluster. (Continued)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2005, 5:19 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/19
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for the different radii ranged from 22–55%, whereas sum-
mer rates ranged from 39–84%.
Discussion
This study illustrates the importance of considering spa-
tial information for outbreak detection, and demonstrates
that using an interpoint distance distribution and precise
address locations is a powerful approach. Using readily
available syndromic data, quite small outbreaks would
generate an alarm when cases are spatially clustered. With
just 10 extra visits per week, or just over one extra visit per
day, spatial clustering was detected about 20% of the
time. When just under six extra clustered visits were added
per day, clustering was detected about 90% of the time.
Although sensitivity varies with cluster parameters, the
absolute values are not of primary importance when eval-
uating the results because some of the simulated clusters
were intended to be difficult to detect. The patterns of
high and low values highlight the effects of the parameters
on sensitivity.
Clusters with the lowest alarm rates were those that were
small in size, large in area, and located close to the hospi-
tal where underlying patient population density was
greatest. Analyses in this paper were for patients at a single
hospital who tend to live close to the hospital. If data from
multiple hospitals were combined, the effect of distance
from the hospital might be diminished as patients are
spread more uniformly over the area of coverage. Also, not
all hospitals are located in dense population centers. In
new locations with different population density character-
istics, the sensitivity of our method will likely vary.
The extreme values of the cluster parameters were chosen
specifically to test the limits of detection. We found that
clusters could be too small (10 extra visits) for our
method to indicate clustering, and that they could be too
widely dispersed (within a circle with a 3 km radius). Mid-
range values in terms of size and cluster radius were sensi-
tive to clustering in our part of the country, and may
appropriately characterize the parameters of clusters
expected during an actual outbreak.
The effect of season is of interest because it suggests that
the choice of alarm thresholds should be tailored to time
of year. However, there is some arbitrariness to seasonal
boundaries based on calendar dates. For example, a week
that was just prior to the date that a season changed may
actually be more like the season that follows that date.
Hence, the strategy for the season that follows may instead
be more appropriate. Furthermore, season itself is not
likely the variable of interest. Instead, variables such as
changing numbers of patients or changing locations from
which patients come may be the factors that affect sensi-
tivity, rather than the season itself. And while in general
these variables change over seasons, the specific time at
which they change varies. For example, influenza season
occurs in the winter, but does not always occur on the
same dates each winter.
Ideally, a detection strategy could more precisely handle
changing characteristics of the baseline data, such as the
onset of influenza season. In other work, we continue to
develop such strategies for the M statistic. We also con-
tinue to test its performance in areas with different geo-
graphic characteristics and with different data types such
as gastrointestinal syndrome or viral tests. And finally, we
are working to extend the utility of our approach by devel-
oping methods to locate where the spatial clustering
occurs.
This study uses the home address of the patient, readily
available in hospital information systems. Should an out-
break spread through a work or school environment, or a
place of common gathering, such as a baseball stadium,
the distribution of patients' home addresses may not ade-
quately reveal the appropriate clustering. However, the
methods are applicable for other patient locations [16]
should more complete location information be obtained
from patients in clinical settings.
Conclusion
Measuring perturbation in the interpoint distance distri-
bution is a sensitive method for detecting the presence of
spatial clusters. When cases are clustered geographically,
there is clearly power to detect clustering when the spatial
distribution is represented by the M statistic, even when
outbreaks are small in size. By varying independent
parameters of simulated outbreaks, we have demon-
strated empirically the limits of detection of different
types of outbreaks.
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